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“Where the natural path of formal amendment is difficult or blocked, alternative 
paths open to political actors to achieve its functional equivalent.” 
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Abstract 
Given the generality of a constitution, it requires amendments in order to enable it 
to cope up with the socio-economic and political dynamics. As a result, formal 
constitutional amendment procedures have remained vital mechanisms in this 
regard. However, the rigidity of formal constitutional amendment procedures 
and/or the political context of a country have often kept constitutions static and 
frequently induce politicians to look for alternatives. Informal constitutional 
amendment mechanisms are thus designed in response to the difficulty of formally 
amending the constitution. In this sense, the role of non-constitutional mechanisms 
in the alteration of a constitution is essential. The FDRE Constitution encompasses 
a constitutional provision that spells out how the Constitution can be amended. 
However, there has not yet been a single formal constitutional amendment. This 
article examines instances of actual but unwritten constitutional changes in the 
course of application that have been occurring in Ethiopia for which formal 
constitutional amendment cannot account for. These include constitutional changes 
through constitutional interpretation, or by legislation. The article contends that 
there are time-honoured practices that regulate and continue to guide the course of 
the Ethiopian federal state in contradiction to the Constitution. Equally important, 
party structure also influences the federal distribution of power.  
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A constitution outlines the major principles and the basic organization, structure, 
and process of a state.2 Most of its content is brief, and “constitutions, by their 
nature, operate in time, seeking to regulate the future on behalf of the past.”3 
Many drafters of constitutions act as if their handiwork should last for a long 
period of time.4 Indeed, every normative constitutional theory presumes that 
constitutions are able to function over a relatively extended period of time. 
Without endurance, constitutions cannot provide a stable basis of politics. This 
assumption of endurance is built into the very idea of a constitution and closely 
related to core normative issues, such as constitutional amendment.5   
The idea of constitutional amendment stems from the argument that no 
generation has a monopoly on knowledge enabling it to bind future generations 
irreversibly, and that “a constitution that will not bend will break”.6 There is 
thus an ‘inherent right’ to amend a constitution in order to perfect 
‘imperfections’ and to strengthen its provisions where necessary.7 Amendment 
denotes the idea of making correction or improvement in the text of a written 
constitution.8 Formal constitutional amendment is more of a norm and continues 
as a widely shared and intrinsic quality of national constitutions.9 The primary 
means of legitimate adjustment on constitutional document is a formal 
procedure specified in the Constitution itself.10 It is equally important to bear in 
                                           
2 Donald J. Boudreaux and A. C. Pritchard (1993), Rewriting the Constitution: An Economic 
Analysis of the Constitutional Amendment Process, Fordham L. Rev.  Vol., 62, Pp. 111- 
162, p. 111. 
3 Tom Ginsburg (2011), “Constitutional endurance” in Tom Ginsburg and Rosalind Dixon, 
eds., Comparative Constitutional Law, Edward Elgar Publishing, p. 112. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid.  
6 John Hatchard, Muna Ndulo, Peter Slinn (2004), Comparative Constitutionalism and Good 
governance in the Commonwealth: An Eastern and Southern African Perspective, 
Cambridge University Press, New York, pp. 44-45. 
7 Ibid.  
8 Rosalind Dixon (2011), “Constitutional Amendment Rules: A Comparative Perspective” in 
Tom Ginsburg and Rosalind Dixon, eds., Comparative Constitutional Law, Edward Elgar 
Publishing, p 96.   
9 Ibid.   
10 Bjørn Erik Rasch, (2008),  Foundations of Constitutional Stability: Veto Points, Qualified 
Majorities, and Agenda-Setting Rules in Amendment Procedures, A Paper presented at the 
ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops Rennes, France, April 11-16, 2008 pp. 3-
4[Hereinafter called,  Bjørn Erik Rasch,  Foundations of Constitutional Stability]. 
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mind that the more fundamental the constitutional change, the weightier 
becomes the reason for resorting to formal processes.11 
However, there are arguments over the function of formal procedures for 
constitutional amendment and comparative difficulty of such processes.12 Most 
constitutional scholars agree that not all forms of constitutional change in fact 
involve formal constitutional amendment processes. Some even have suggested, 
ultimately formal constitutional amendments will be irrelevant to shape 
constitutional meaning.13 Irrespective of these arguments, constitutions have 
special procedures and require the involvement of majorities for their 
amendment, often requiring some measure of consent from the legislatures or 
the public.14 Nevertheless, amendment rules have often made constitutions 
difficult to change and the politics of their constitutional amendment has proven 
to be very divisive. As a consequence, several countries frequently look for 
alternatives to formal constitutional amendment mechanisms.15 In this regard, 
the role of non-constitutional mechanisms in the alteration of the Constitution is 
essential. In particular, the function, relation and co-existence of formal and 
non-formal constitutional amendment mechanisms need to be clearly spelled 
out. The extent to which and the circumstances under which informal 
constitutional mechanisms modify the contents of a given constitution need to 
be ascertained. 
The FDRE Constitution expressly provides for the mechanisms of its 
modification which includes, setting different amendment formula to amend 
various sections of the Constitution.16 The Constitution also expresses that a 
proposed constitutional amendment is required to be submitted for discussion 
and decision to the general public and to those whom the amendment of the 
Constitution concerns.17 Despite this fact, the Constitution has not undertaken 
any formal amendment so far. The exception to this was the move to amend 
article 9818 of the Constitution, titled ‘concurrent power of taxation’ that gave 
the federal government the legislative and executive power over the concurrent 
taxation restricting the power of the state only to get the proceeds thereof.  
                                           
11 Getachew Assefa (2012), Ethiopian Constitutional Law with Comparative Notes and 
Materials: A Text book, p. 103. 
12 Ibid.   
13 Id., p. 100. 
14 George Anderson (2008), Federalism: An Introduction, Oxford University Press, p 59. 
15 Ibid.  
16 See article 105 of the FDRE Constitution. 
17 Id., article 104. 
18 Solomon Negussie (2008), Fiscal Federalism in the Ethiopian Ethnic-based Federal 
System, Rev. ed. Netherlands Wolf legal publishers p.64.  
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In doing so, formal amendment was initiated, and the proposed amendment 
passed through a number of stages. However, Negarit Gazette did not proclaim 
the proposed amendment.19 In practice, this provision of the Constitution 
changed and, the federal government has been empowered to determine the 
scope of the tax as well as the rate, and administer the same (concurrent power 
of taxation), while the regional states are entitled for their share. Except for this 
circumstance, the Constitution has served for more than two decades without 
making a formal amendment. However, there are ample instances of actual but 
unwritten constitutional changes conceivably occurring in Ethiopia for which 
formal constitutional amendment cannot account for. One can thus argue that 
informal procedures for constitutional amendment can play a role in 
reconstituting the Constitution and to reset the constitutional meaning for 
subsequent constitutional developments.   
This article examines these practices of informal constitutional changes in 
Ethiopia. The first section deals with conceptual and theoretical frameworks of 
constitutional amendment. The second section discusses formal constitutional 
amendments in general. This part explains textual amendments, which are 
usually considered as conventional vehicles for amending a Constitution. 
Section 3 takes up various mechanisms of non-textual ways of introducing 
changes in the life of the Constitution such as judicial interpretation, legislation, 
party practice and political customs. The Ethiopian experience of formal 
constitutional amendment and mechanisms of informal change are discussed in 
Sections 4 and 5. These sections further highlight historical and conceptual 
perspectives of formal and informal constitutional changes in Ethiopia.  
1. The Concept of Constitutional Amendment: A theoretical 
framework  
The constitution of any country is intended to capture the essence and wishes of 
the people. Such norms and desires of the people are dynamic and evolve after 
they are initially formed.20 In view of the dynamic nature of society and their 
aspirations over time, constitutions cannot remain immutable.21 Ginsburg argues 
that constitutions “exist in a world of change, and so must adjust to changing 
conditions”.22 Amendment is a mechanism that preserves the continuity of the 
                                           
19 Ibid.    
20 Rosalind Dixon (2010), “Amending Constituting Identity”, Chicago Public Law and 
Legal Theory, Working paper No. 332, p. 1. 
21 Gabriel L. Negretto (2011), Replacing and Amending Constitutions: The Logic of 
Constitutional Change in Latin America, paper prepared for delivery at the 2011 
American Political Science Association Meeting, Seattle, Washington, September 1-4,  p 
751. 
22 Ginsburg (2011) supra note 3, p. 112. 
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constitution in a changing environment.23 By implication, constitutional 
amendment processes are of foundational value for making changes, and allow 
political actors to respond to the changing political, social, and economic needs 
of the political community.24 For this reason, every constitution must provide 
some method by which it could be amended as conditions and circumstances 
dictate to make periodic reconsideration of fundamental principles. A 
constitution is supposed to be changed in ways that the provision of the 
constitution describes.25 It is imperative that the essence of amendment be 
sufficiently articulated and understood.  
Rosalind Dixon defines constitutional amendment as the idea of making 
correction or improvement upon prior constitutional design choices in light of 
new information, evolving experiences or political understandings.26 He 
contends that constitutional ‘amendment’ generally requires some kind of 
formal legal deposit in the text of a written constitution.27  Unlike ordinary 
legislation, constitutions thus commonly entrench one or more amendment 
formula to modify their text.28 Providing a legal and transparent framework that 
enables to alter the constitution29 and fix defects (revealed by time and 
experience) is an essential function of formal amendment rules.30 Formal 
amendment rules structure the process by which political actors change the text 
and meaning of a constitution.31 This may lead to the argument that a formal 
constitutional amendment process can be (and are typically) used to a wide 
range of constitutional alterations. However, this is not tantamount to requiring 
every constitutional modification to pass through the formal amendment 
channels.  
In support of informal amendment, Strauss argues that formal amendments, 
which are adopted in a constitution, are actually not a very important way of 
changing it.32 “Most constitutional scholars agree that not all forms of 
constitutional change in fact involve formal processes of constitutional 
amendment”.33 The claim here is that some forms of modification can be made 
                                           
23 Negretto, supra note 21, p. 749. 
24 Richard  Albert (2013), “The Expressive Function of Constitutional Amendment Rules”, 
McGill Law Journal Vol. 59, No.2 Pp. 225-281, p. 233. 
25 David A. Strauss  (2010), The living Constitution,  Oxford University Press,  New York,   
p. 115. 
26 Dixon (2011) ., supra note 8,  p. 96 
27 Id., p 97. 
28 Albert (2014), supra note 1, p. 1033. 
29 Albert (2013), supra note 24, p. 232. 
30 Id., p. 227. 
31 Id., p. 232. 
32 Strauss, (2010), supra note 25,  p. 115.  
33 Dixon (2011), supra note 8, p. 97. 
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informally without setting the constitutional amendment process in motion. This 
is because some institutions like courts and legislative bodies are also 
established to undertake such task. As Richard Albert noted, although the idea 
of formal amendment has American roots, as expressly embodied in Article V 
of the United States Constitution,34 the pace of formal amendment in the United 
States is decelerating.35 And now, the dominant mode of ‘updating’ 
constitutional meaning has turned out to be via a process of judicial 
interpretation.36 This leads to an argument that constitutions can be modified 
over time without textual changes, typically by means of constitutional court 
rulings and, less visibly, by legislative and executive decisions, or by the 
informal practices of political actors’.37 
One may generally state informal amendment as a process involving 
alteration of constitutional meaning in the absence of textual change.38 An 
informal amendment occurs when political norms change, or courts, the most 
conventional actors of informal amendment, interpret or construct the 
constitution so as to bring it in line with policy preferences.39 Hence, political 
actors alter constitutional meaning or update the constitutional text informally 
without a corresponding alteration to the constitutional text as time and 
experience expose faults in its design and new challenges emerge in the 
constitutional community. 
It can be argued that formal amendment rules provide a legal and transparent 
framework within which a constitution can be altered, whereas informal 
amendment occurs supposedly pursuant to extralegal procedures. To call 
informal amendment ‘extralegal’ is not to make a claim against its legitimacy.40 
For that matter, the purpose of describing formal amendment rules as ‘legal’ and 
informal amendment procedures as ‘extralegal’ is merely meant to highlight that 
the former is vividly outlined in a constitutional text while the latter is 
entrenched within it.41 Put differently, the difference between formal and 
informal amendment is not that one is a set of legal rules and the other is not; it 
is, that the former is textually entrenched through legal rules while the latter is 
not.42 It should be noted here that both formal and informal amendments adjust 
                                           
34 Albert (2014), supra note 1, p. 1033. 
35 Ibid.   
36 Dixon (2011) supra note 8, p. 339. 
37 Negretto, (2011), supra note 21, p. 3. 
38 Richard Albert (2014a), “The Structure of Constitutional Amendment Rules”, Wake 
Forest Law Review, Vol. 49, pp. 913-75, p. 914. 
39 Albert (2013), supra note 24, p. 227. 
40 Id., p. 232. 
41 Ibid . 
42 Id., p. 233. 
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basic constitutional values in tune with changing political and social 
circumstances by incorporating into a constitution a broader and more inclusive 
understanding of these values.43   
2. Formal Constitutional Amendment 
Constitutions obsolesce rapidly, and must be updated over time to cope with 
changes in the country’s circumstances and citizens’ values.44 Changing social 
circumstances and understandings will often make provisions of a constitution 
outdated.45 Therefore, a constitution is expected to regulate new/dynamic 
circumstances that have evolved after the constitution was initially framed. The 
issue here is: what process should be followed in updating a constitution? 
Richard, in this regard, notes that fixing defects of a constitution is an essential 
function of formal amendment rules.46 Getachew also underlines that 
amendment “is without any doubt the most formal way in which a constitution 
takes care of problems it suffers”.47 It is thus natural for a constitution to 
describe the principal modes of changing its rules, be it the substance of the 
provision or its scope of applicability. If periodic replacement of a constitution 
is not feasible, the next plausible option is sticking to a formal constitutional 
amendment process, which is stated in the constitution itself. In this sense, 
formal constitutional amendment procedures have important functions in a 
constitutional democracy. In cases of major constitutional change, they help to 
ensure that change occurs via legal, rather than extra-legal, means.48  
As Albert states: “[i]n the normal course of affairs, a state amends its 
constitution in accordance with the constitutional amendment procedures spelled 
out in the constitutional text. These amendment procedures will typically 
identify the individuals, institutions or bodies” that are authorized to propose an 
amendment to the existing constitution and they prescribe the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for amending the same.49 Thus, amendment becomes valid 
only if it adheres to the procedural requirements set out in detail in the 
Constitution and is proposed by those persons who are authorized to do so. Such 
amendment becomes law only if it meets those, often stringent, requirements. 
                                           
43 Albert (2014), supra note 1, p. 1061. 
44 Adrian Vermeule (2004), “Constitutional Amendments and  the Constitutional Common 
Law”, Chicago  Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper, no. 73 p. 1. 
45 Rosalind Dixon and Richard T. Holden (2011), “Constitutional Amendment Rules: The 
Denominator Problem”, Chicago, Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper, No. 346, 
p. 1. 
46 Albert, (2013), supra note 24, p. 227.  
47 Getachew, supra note 11, p. 103.  
48 Dixon and Holden (2011), supra note 45, p. 1.  
49 Richard Albert, (2010), “Nonconstitutional Amendments”, Canadian Journal of Law and 
Jurisprudence, Vol. xxii, No.1 pp. 1- 43,  p. 13. 
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The textual procedures are, therefore, “both the beginning and the end of the 
constitutional amendment process”.50 It is only when the amendment effort 
successfully goes through the procedures that it would introduce changes into 
the written constitutional order.51 
However, there are substantive limits to valid constitutional changes. These 
occur where a constitution contains “Eternal Clause” or “unamendable” 
provisions.52 This relates to constitutional provisions that immunize certain 
provisions of a constitution against amendment. These parts of the constitution 
can be altered neither by judicial construction nor through constitutionally 
entrenched amendment procedures.53 Changing an unamendable constitutional 
provision is unthinkable except through comprehensive constitutional renewals 
that would bring about a paradigm shift.54 
Save the issue of eternal clause as an exception to a formal amendment 
process, countries have different amendment requirements which may be 
grouped into three general categories: legislative majority, double passage 
requirements (this is the case where the bill is expected to pass through two 
houses of parliament), and referendum requirements.55 Others (that opt to 
express the exact degree of difficulty) categorize amendment requirements into 
four groups: legislative supermajority requirements, parliamentary quorum 
requirements, state ratification, and referendum requirements.56  
While affirming formal constitutional amendment mechanism is extremely 
important (and a necessary means) to introduce change into the constitution, the 
onerous nature of amendment requirements and the difficulty of adhering to the 
requirements spelled out in the constitution render a constitutional amendment 
difficult. For example, if an amendment is required to pass two Houses of 
parliament, its approval can be too difficult as compared to a bill which can be 
enacted by one house.57 The rigour of the process can be even more difficult if a 
bill is required to pass through a constituent unit legislative council as well.58 In 
effect, stiff amendment requirements that were initially envisaged by framers of 
a constitution would inevitably cause the dilemma for countries between 
pursuance of the formal amendment path or looking for other mechanisms.  
                                           
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid.  
52 Getachew, supra note 11, p. 103. 
53 Albert, (2010), supra note 49, p.  9. 
54 Ibid.  
55 Dixon and Holden (2011), supra note 45, p. 8. 
56 Ibid.  
57 This assertion should be viewed in a State where both houses are not dominated by a 
single party or a single house not controlled by a single party. 
58 Dixon and Holden (2011), supra note 45, p.  8.  
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Based on this reasoning, we can find several examples of constitutional 
change that did not follow formal procedures laid down in constitutions. For 
example, the U.S. and Australia59 have written requirements for constitutional 
amendment that are unusually onerous. In both countries, it is practically 
difficult to conduct wholly successful constitutional amendment campaigns.60 
Given the fact that almost every constitution worldwide imposes some form of 
super-majority requirement for successful constitutional amendment, this has 
negative bearings on the chance of successful textual constitutional change.61 In 
the United States, the difficulty to adhere to the amendment procedure outlined 
in Article V of the US Constitution has rerouted the pursuance of constitutional 
from formal to informal amendment.62 The difficulty of formally amending the 
Constitution has accordingly forced political actors to update the Constitution 
informally through non- Article V methods, leaving the actual constitutional text 
unchanged.63 Some argue that the amendment procedures under Article V are 
too cumbersome and erratic to serve as the sole vehicle for constitutional 
development in a complex and rapidly changing society.64   
There are several other more flexible modes of constitutional change that do 
not rely on the mechanistic procedures of Article V in order to keep the 
constitutional regime current and reflective of new social and political 
equilibria.65 These modes enable constitutional change by political adaptation as 
well as legislative and executive bodies. Such informal constitutional 
amendment mechanisms have drawn growing attention within governments and 
among scholars as they are ubiquitous and inevitable.66 This flows from the 
inevitable fact of informal ways of introducing changes in the life of a 
constitution, as a result of the rigidity of formal constitutional amendment 
methods and given the quantity and generality of a written constitution. 
Therefore, informal constitutional amendment procedures may play a role in 
reconstituting constitutional meaning in response to cumbersome constitutional 
amendment requirements. As a result, non-text-based constitutional changes can 
attain the objectives of formal amendment mechanisms in resetting the 
constitutional meaning for subsequent constitutional developments. 
                                           
59 These two countries are known for introducing change in their constitutions informally, 
and are being cited in a numbers of scholarly articles for so doing. 
60 Dixon (2010), supra note 20, p. 9. 
61 Ibid, p. 10. 
62 Albert, (2014), supra note 1, p. 1051. 
63 Id., pp. 1051-2. 
64 Id., p. 1052. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Albert, (2013), supra note 24, p. 225. 
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It should be noted that a constitution does not specifically list informal 
amendment processes as forms of its modification.67 Rather, these methods 
depend on interpretations of what the constitution says and on interpretive 
understanding of the underlying intent.68 These may happen where there are new 
situations, which cannot be addressed by existing provisions of a constitution, or 
when there are gaps in an existing constitution. In these scenarios, courts and the 
representative bodies interpret provisions of a constitution in a creative manner 
to keep the constitutional regime up-to-date and reflective of new social and 
political changes without relying solely on the formal procedure. This is because 
it is not feasible to rely on formal constitutional amendment procedures for all 
unfolding new circumstances and gaps in a constitution created by dynamic 
realities. Against this backdrop, one may dare argue that informal constitutional 
amendment procedures may somewhat have remote constitutional base.  
3. Informal Constitutional Amendment 
As highlighted in the preceding sections, constitutional change can occur in the 
course of its application even in the absence of formal amendments.69 Most 
countries with difficult constitutional amendment procedures have developed 
“non-textual” alternatives of introducing constitutional changes, inter alia, 
through judicial review.70 So, the level of rigidity has direct repercussions on the 
extent to which the courts and the representative bodies interpret provisions 
(more informally) in a creative manner.71 These informal mechanisms mainly 
result from experiences of government action under the constitution. Hence, 
informal amendment is the need to correct constitutional deficiencies with 
diligence and efficacy.72 
There are different types of informal change in the constitutional 
arrangement of a country. The first possibility is gradual revision of the 
                                           
67 Boundless. “Informal Methods of Amending the Constitution: Societal Change and 





68 Ibid.  
69 Rasch, supra note 10, p. 9. 
70 Iris Nguyên-Duy, (2013), Playing Doctor Frankenstein when Re-forming the 
Constitution? Some thoughts on recent developments in the United Kingdom and 
Norway, a Paper for the international Conference “The Importance of Constitutions” Held 
at the Swedish Institute in Istanbul, Turkey, 23-25 October 2013, p. 9. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Id., p. 11. 
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constitutional framework by means of judicial interpretation.73 Strauss, for 
example, argues that in the US, the Supreme Court generally interprets “the 
Constitution more or less in line with the kinds of changes in circumstances, 
understandings and even majoritarian demands that can lead to successful” 
constitutional amendments.74  
The second possibility is revision of the constitutional text by irregular 
means. There are constitutional amendments that would not have been valid if 
the formal amendment and ratification process laid down in a constitution had 
been strictly followed.75 One can find several examples of constitutional 
changes that do not follow the formal processes laid down in the constitution. 
The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the 
Endangered Species Act of 1973 are suggested examples of informal 
amendments in the United States without adhering to amendment requirements 
stated in Article V.76 The third possibility is intended or unintended revision of 
the constitutional framework by means of political adaptation through 
legislative and executive bodies.77 Such informal amendments include 
legislation, judicial interpretation, executive action and convention.78.  
3.1 Legislation  
The framers of a constitution create the basic skeleton of different institutions, 
and they entrench particular solutions to a relatively narrow set of questions. For 
the rest, they seek to create a set of political institutions and empower those 
institutions to deal creatively with ongoing developments that cannot be 
effectively addressed by solely using the formal text in the constitution.79 
Therefore, there may be many other documents that supplement the text of the 
constitution and provide for the actual set of constitutional rules.80 These might 
include court decisions and legislation that provide for core aspects of 
governance and supplement the formal text. In the latter case, constitutional 
                                           
73 Rasch, supra note 10, pp. 3-4. 
74 Dixon (2011),  supra note 8, p. 96. 
75 Rasch, (2008), supra note 10, pp. 3-4. 
76 Albert, (2014) supra note 1, p. 1063. 
77 Rasch, supra note 10, pp. 3-4. 
78 Albert (2014) supra note 1, p. 1062. 
79 See for example, Ernest Young A. (2007), “The Constitution Outside the Constitution”, 
Yale Law Journal, Vol. 117, pp. 408-473, p. 456. 
80 Tom Ginsburg, (2010) “Constitutional Specificity, Unwritten Understandings and 
Constitutional Agreement”, in A. Sajo and R. Uitz, eds., Constitutional Topography: 
Values and Constitutions, Eleven international publishing, in The Netherlands, p.73. 
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documents are described as the ‘law for making laws’ through which all other 
laws are made and enforced.81  
Constitutions include some of the most fundamental rules. These include 
rules about the machinery of government and make general specifications about 
rights of citizens. These constraints enable the legislature to make further 
law/decisions to achieve objectives of the constitution while reducing the risks 
of violating constitutional principles. These are a few mechanisms available to 
the legislature, outside formal amendment, to influence constitutional meaning. 
Empowering a legislature to detail the general principle is sufficient condition to 
alter and influence a meaning in a constitution. This enables informal 
amendment through national legislation.82  
The legislature has been a major agent in informal constitutional 
amendments in two ways. First, it passes many laws to spell out several of a 
constitution’s brief provisions.83 Often, constitutions endeavour to set out the 
major tasks of governments and generally outline many issues in a holistic 
manner. Therefore, taking the general principles enshrined in a constitution into 
account, these matters should be governed by legislation. This is one way of 
making necessary changes in the provision of a constitution. Second, the 
legislature adds to a constitution the way in which it uses its powers.84 As 
Rosalind Dixon notes: 
 A principle of partial amendment does not purport to allow a legislature to 
add to or subtract from the text of the Constitution outside the requirements 
of amendment procedures. Rather, it allows legislature to provide information 
to the Court, with a view to influencing the Court’s interpretation of existing 
constitutional text.85 
In the United States, the theory of ‘super-statutes’ illustrates, with important 
limitations, how national legislation informally amends a constitution.86 There 
are certain statutes (in the US) that are passed in the normal course of the 
legislative process but acquire quasi-constitutional status. However, these 
statutes are expected to fulfil four criteria to obtain such status.87 First, they 
introduce a new principle or policy whose effect is substantial. Second, the new 
principle or policy becomes foundational or axiomatic to political actors. Third, 
                                           
81 Roger D. Congleton, (2003), Improving Democracy through Constitutional Reform, Some 
Swedish Lessons, Kluwer Academic Press, Boston,  p. 11. 
82 Albert (2014) supra note 1, p. 1063.  
83 Johnson Carl. Informal Amendment 
<www.jenksps.org/pages/uploaded_files/Informal%20Amendment.pdf> 
84 Ibid. 
85 Dixon (2011), supra note 8, p. 670.  
86 Albert(2014), supra note 1, p. 1063. 
87 Ibid. 
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they result from long and deliberative public discussions and substantial 
reflection by political actors. Fourth, they require some elaboration from 
officials and judges in order to achieve their intended effect.88  
Super-statutes, which fulfil these criteria, acquire their normative force 
through a series of public confrontations and debates over time. Super-statutes 
influenced by social norms may occasionally change constitutional meaning. 
They do so by trumping ordinary legislation and by establishing ‘foundational 
principles’ against which people presume their obligations and rights are set, 
and through which interpreters apply ordinary law. The Sherman Antitrust Act 
of 1890, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Endangered Species Act of 1973 
are suggested examples. In addition to the aforementioned Acts of the United 
States, the United Kingdom Human Rights Act of 1998, the Canadian Bill of 
Rights of 1960, and the Canada Health Act also constitute typical examples of 
super-statutes.89 
3.2 Constitutional interpretation  
Constitutional interpretation has two meanings. The first meaning, usually 
regarded as the classic meaning, “relates to the review of constitutionality of 
laws and actions of the state authorities that contravene the constitution”. 90 The 
second “meaning of constitutional interpretation is what we can call expounding 
on the text of the constitution” and it “may relate to any type of dispute that may 
arise in relation to the constitution or its provision”, as in the case of a dispute 
“whether two provisions or principles in the constitution conflict with each 
other” thereby rightly becoming “a matter for constitutional interpretation”.91 
Moreover, a gap in the constitution regarding important constitutional rights or 
principles may become a matter of constitutional interpretation.92 
Drafters of constitutions often use general provisions, which are composed of 
ambiguous terms that provide flexibility to compromise.93 Given the quantity 
and generality of a constitution, it is not surprising that such a document 
requires interpretation.94 Constitutions proclaim all the values their framers 
believe essential to a good society but do not prioritize those values. Resolving 
conflict among basic values is thus left to the implementers and interpreters.95 
However, constitutional provisions often offer little specific guidance for the 
                                           
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid.  
90 Getachew (2012), supra note 11, p. 509. 
91 Ibid.  
92 Ibid.  
93 Martin Edelman (2005), “Written Constitutions, Democracy and Judicial Interpretation: 
the Hobgoblin of Judicial Activism”, Albany Law Review, Vol., 68, pp.  585- 596, p 591. 
94 Ibid.  
95 Id., p 592. 
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resolution of particulars in constitutional claims.96 This makes it necessary for 
constitutional adjudicators to specify the meaning of the provision in the context 
of actual cases.97 Wherever there is a written constitution whose “text is 
indeterminate, the courts are called upon to fashion a meaning”.98 It is in this 
sense that “constitution amendment processes tend to be linked to judicial 
interpretation”.99 Thus, constitutional interpretation, unlike ordinary law cases, 
has greater impact in shaping a constitutional order.100 
In the United States for instance, interpreting the constitutional text has been 
the preeminent activity of the Supreme Court for nearly two centuries. Indeed, 
the Supreme Court interpreting the written constitutional text is the essence of 
constitutional law in the United States. Courts, especially the Supreme Court, 
interpret and apply the Constitution in all of the cases they hear.101 In an event 
when the court declares that the words of a provision are plain and clear, or in 
situations where several meanings are possible and one meaning is chosen over 
the other, one can imagine its effect in shaping the constitutional text.  
A Supreme Court judgment that interprets a vague constitutional provision 
might amount to an unwritten constitutional amendment.102 The Supreme Court 
has, from time to time, amended the United States Constitution without 
implementing the procedures required by Article V.103At this stage, it is possible 
to argue that in the United States, interpreting a constitution may involve 
constitutional amendment. Informal amendment by judicial interpretation is 
more likely to occur in countries with a low rate of formal amendment and a 
long-established constitution. The practices in Australia, Finland, and Ireland as 
well suggest frequent informal amendment by judicial interpretation as a 
supplement to the formal amendment process.104 
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3.3 Practices of political parties  
Political parties have been major players in the shaping of governments. The 
structure of party systems and “the way political parties are organized might 
reinforce or corrode the federal division of powers”.105 There is also “a strong 
correlation between government party leaders tampering with the constitution to 
secure more terms than what is constitutionally permitted and the flaring up of 
acute conflict”.106 Therefore, “the roles played by political parties are important 
determinants in the operation of federal systems”107 and can affect the 
constitutional and institutional guarantees. Constitutional and institutional 
guarantees are meant to prevent political leaders at the central level of the 
federation from breaking the rules or changing the federal bargain unilaterally. 
These guarantees could be ineffectual when one homogeneous party controls 
both levels of government, because then it is more unlikely that there will be 
opposition against the change.108  
3.4 Political norms/ political custom  
Custom implies usual practices that have no formal obligatory effect.109 Despite 
its light obligatory nature, unwritten political custom may be as strong as written 
laws.110 Political norms change or construct the constitution so as to bring it in 
line with policy preferences.111 A well-established practice, which has been 
developed within a given political system, could alter the constitutional 
regime.112 By the same token, constitutions may alternatively be amended 
informally by political norms/political customs. This occurs when a political 
practice is adopted and repeated, and gradually hardens over time without 
expressly overturning constitutional provisions. This also takes place by means 
of usage within the legislative and executive bodies.113 In this regard, 
constitutions are susceptible to informal amendment through an established 
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political custom. This occurs when a political practice is adopted and repeated, 
and gradually hardens into what Gerhardt calls “non-judicial precedent.”114  
An example in this regard is the issue “whether the Vice President of the 
United States becomes President upon the President’s death, or whether the Vice 
President simply assumes the powers and duties of the presidency as a caretaker. 
The text of the United States Constitution is ambiguous on this point”.115 Vice 
President John Tyler resolved the ambiguity upon the death of President 
William Harrison in 1841.116 The Tyler precedent resolved the question left 
open by the constitutional text. Subsequent Vice Presidents followed the Tyler 
precedent and proclaimed themselves President when they succeeded to the 
presidency.117Although Tyler’s claim probably contradicted the framers’ intent, 
later Vice Presidents who found themselves in that situation embraced his 
position and ultimately the Tyler precedent is accepted as constitutional 
reality.118 
4. The Ethiopian Legal Regime on Formal Constitutional 
Amendment  
The FDRE Constitution embodies provisions that spell out how the Constitution 
can be amended.119 These provisions are designed to ensure the involvement of 
states in incidents of constitutional amendment. The provisions embody clear 
procedural requirements toward formal amendment, and they show how a 
constitutional proposal, which is formally initiated and ratified, is inscribed in 
the constitutional text. Therefore, those amendments that pass through the 
conventional vehicles of formal amendment process become valid to all intents 
and purposes as part of the Constitution.  
Although the Constitution expressly provides for the mechanisms of 
constitutional amendment, there are no express ‘eternal clauses’ that make some 
constitutional provisions non-amendable. It does not even prohibit the abrogation 
of or impediments to the rights conferred in Chapter Three of the Constitution 
(titled Fundamental Rights and Freedoms) with a view to rendering such 
amendment/s unconstitutional.120  
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Formal amendment procedures usually identify the individuals, institutions 
or bodies that are authorized to propose amendment to the existing constitution. 
However, the FDRE Constitution does not expressly indicate who can propose 
an amendment, be it group of individuals or institutions, and the procedure to be 
followed for the initiation of constitutional amendment.121 Fasil argues that the 
“formal initiation of constitutional amendment can come from either the 
regional or federal legislative organs”.122 He further states “where the initiation 
comes from the regional states, a two third of state councils must support the 
draft amendment by majority vote. Otherwise, either of the federal Houses can 
initiate a constitutional amendment by a two third majority vote”.123 One can 
possibly infer from Fasil’s argument that an amendment to the Constitution can 
be tabled either by the federal Houses or State Councils but not by the general 
public.  
On the other hand, the Constitution requires a proposed constitutional 
amendment to be submitted for discussion and decision to the general public and 
to whom the amendment of the Constitution concerns.124 This can be done if the 
proposal for constitutional amendment is supported by a two-third majority vote 
in the House of Peoples' Representatives (hereinafter, HoPR), or by a two-third 
majority vote in the House of Federation or when one third of the State Councils 
of the member States of the Federation, by a majority vote in each Council.125 
The role of the public seems either to approve the proposed amendment 
whenever it provides for a better protection, or reject the proposal when a 
proposed amendment adversely affects the minimum constitutional privileges. If 
the general public stands against the proposed amendment, an issue arises 
whether the views of the legislative council or the general public would prevail.  
The first line of argument is based on Article 105 of the FDRE Constitution 
that deals with constitutional amendment. This provision does not prohibit the 
submission of constitutional amendment proposal to the federal and regional 
state legislative councils for consideration if it is rejected by the general public. 
As a matter of fact, the Constitution does not indicate the role of the general 
public in the ratification process. It only mentions the involvement of the 
members of the federal Houses and regional state councils. One can thus argue 
that any proposal of constitutional amendment may be submitted for approval 
irrespective of its rejection by the general public. A bill, which is approved with 
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the involvement of the legislative councils of both levels of government, 
becomes part of the constitution.   
On the other hand, the aforementioned argument can be regarded as 
incongruent with the sovereign power of people since the members of the 
legislative councils are representative of the people. It is true that principally 
sovereignty lies on the people.126 What follows from this is that the 
constitutional amendment process should be controlled and owned by the people 
who form state power. This leads to interrogating the legitimacy of legislative 
councils to act contrary to public need. Even if both have different tests, the 
need of the people should have greater weight on what should be included in 
and excluded from the Constitution. 
Article 105 of the FDRE Constitution, titled “Amendment of the 
Constitution”, provides for different amendment standards or amendment 
procedures to modify the various sections of the Constitution. The first category 
of procedures requires majority approval from both federal houses, in addition 
to simple majority vote from each of the nine regional states legislatures. This 
kind of amendment, for the purpose of the FDRE Constitution, may be 
characterized as special amendment. The second category of amendment 
formula requires a majority of both houses and majority approval from two third 
of the states’ council. This sort of amendment can be referred to as ordinary/ 
general amendment.  
4.1 Ordinary/General amendment procedure  
This general amending formula applies to wider sections of the Constitution. 
This kind of procedure is applicable to all provisions of the Constitution other 
than those provisions, which are found in Chapter Three, Articles 105(1) and 
104. A general amending procedure requires the assent of the two federal houses 
and two-thirds of the Councils of the member States of the federation.127 It 
requires approval by a simple majority vote in state council of member states, 
followed by the approval of the House of Peoples’ Representatives and the 
House of Federation by two-third majority vote in joint sitting. Thus, approval 
by a two-third majority in both houses, followed by ratification from the 
legislatures of two-third of the states, by majority vote, is a sufficient condition 
to endorse the proposed amendment.  
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4.2 Special amendment procedure  
A special amendment procedure is enshrined in the Constitution to amend some 
sections of the Constitution. These are Chapter Three,128 Articles 104 and 105. 
The matters that fall within the scope of this stringent standard are the sections 
that deal with fundamental rights and freedoms and a provision that deals with 
constitutional amendment. These provisions require the unanimous assent of all 
member states, by majority vote, followed by the approval of the federal houses, 
sitting and voting separately, in which the requisite approval must be a ‘double 
majority’ of votes, which involves members of House of People Representatives 
and House of Federation.129 
The general and special amendment procedures are applicable to amend the 
Constitution formally in a textual manner. This means that FDRE Constitution 
authorizes amendments that respect the textual strictures of the Constitution. In 
contrast, there is the inclination toward informal constitution changes in the 
course of application in Ethiopia. Probable reasons for this seem to be the 
political cost and financial implications of formal constitutional amendment. A 
case in point in this regard relates to failed efforts to amend article 98 of the 
Constitution shortly after the amendment proposal passed a number of stages. 
This gives us insight as to why a dominant party’s power in government does 
not necessarily guarantee the introduction of any kind of amendment the party 
wants to make.  
Formal constitutional amendment may cost the government politically. 
Opposition political actors had intensified call for constitutional change 
specifically to amend some of the provisions of the Constitution.130 However, 
the EPRDF considers the Constitution as the foundation of the nation and it 
argues that any plan to amend the Constitution goes against constitutionalism. 
The EPRDF has also made bold statements describing the FDRE Constitution as 
one of the best constitutions in the world and not subject for amendment in 
recent decades. After having made these statements, engagement in formal 
constitutional amendment, might seem contradicting oneself. It opens, perhaps, 
room for further questions of constitutional amendment, which could be 
unwelcomed by the EPDRF and its supporters. More importantly, most of the 
informal changes made against the Constitution have the effect of increasing the 
power of the federal government. If the government makes similar changes by 
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pursuing the conventional textual method, the government will be blamed of 
tendencies toward more centralization officially in violation of the principles of 
federalism.  
With regard to the financial cost, formal constitutional amendments at least, 
require arranging consultative meetings with the society as well as lobbying and 
convincing them that the amendment will not affect their interest. Such forums 
are necessary to ensure adequate deliberation on the potential advantages and 
disadvantages of any proposed constitutional change.131 Where this is the case, 
“the time– and therefore also opportunity cost– of debating proposed 
constitutional amendments will have a clear relationship with the size of the 
relevant voting body.” 132  
The more members are involved at various stages of a proposed constitutional 
amendment process, the longer will be the time that is required for discussion 
and decision. As the size of the participants increases, arranging consultative 
meeting, which enables the participants to exchange ideas and debate (over a 
benefit and disadvantage of the proposed amendment), will increase the time 
taken to introduce change and this has financial implication.  Organizing forums 
frequently with the society to lobby and convince them that the amendment will 
not affect their interest will cost the government financially. This cost has the 
potential not only to increase but also become high when the participants of the 
forum are large in number. 133 
In this sense, the Ethiopian discourse of constitutional amendment makes 
sense when one considers how a constitutional amendment is initiated and how 
this proposed amendment is ratified. In Ethiopia, the process of constitutional 
amendment envisages the involvement of the general public,134 at various 
stages, i.e. the initiation stage, during the discussion and decision of the 
proposed constitutional amendment. Moreover, the FDRE Constitution also 
requires that any constitutional amendment “shall be submitted for discussion 
and decision to those whom the amendment of the Constitution concerns”.135 
One can argue that since the Constitution requires involvement of the general 
public and those communities “whom the amendment of the Constitution 
concerns”, the amendment process will take more time and debating over a 
proposed constitutional amendment will have high cost. As a result, informal 
amendment seems to be the course pursued in Ethiopia to adapt the current 
Constitution with changing socio-economic and political situations and 
understandings.  
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5. Informal Methods of Constitution ‘Amendment’: The 
Ethiopian Experience  
Informal amendment mechanisms have been the subject of great controversy in 
contemporary constitutional politics and there is controversy as to when a 
change is regarded as informal amendment.  It should be noted that, every kind 
of informal amendment may not necessarily have the same kind of justification 
and each informal amendment method may be justified independently. As 
Albert notes, “It is difficult to pin down the difference in the substantive effects 
of the formal acts of amending the Constitution and the informal acts of 
interpreting it”.136 For instance, in the US, informal amendment by judicial 
interpretation occurs when the Supreme Court interprets the Constitution as a 
final matter. In contrast, “judicial interpretation by lower courts is generally not 
nationally binding and it is therefore less accurate to define it as an informal 
amendment”.137  
Second, even at the Supreme Court level, not all-constitutional 
interpretations cause an informal amendment. An informal amendment by 
judicial interpretation occurs where the Supreme Court confers constitutional 
status upon an unwritten constitutional principle. In such a case, there is no 
functional difference in constitutional effect between a textual rule entrenched in 
the constitution by formal amendment and an unwritten rule entrenched by 
judicial interpretation.138 With this state of affairs in mind, one can apply the 
same analogy to the decision of the House of Federation.  The decision of the 
House is final over matters submitted to it and the decision of the House binds 
any government organ.139 The decision of the House remains binding unless it is 
changed by itself. The decision of the House has general effect, which can be 
applicable on similar constitutional matters that may arise in the future.140 This 
amounts to altering a constitution through unusual mechanisms or informally. 
Political norms/custom is the other mechanism of making an informal 
constitutional amendment. When a constitution is ambiguous and where 
political actors consciously establish a new democratic practice that has been 
adopted and repeated, this can be regarded as informal constitutional 
amendment if the repetition of the new practice is intended to compel their 
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successors into compliance,. This occurs when a political practice gradually 
hardens into what Michael Gerhardt calls “non-judicial precedent” that is 
accepted as constitutional reality. 141  
As far as constitutional amendment by legislation is concerned, there may be 
certain legislations that are passed in the normal course of the legislative process 
but acquire quasi-constitutional status. This is the case where there is a newly 
introduced principle or policy whose effect is substantial. Moreover, the new 
principle or policy becomes foundational to political actors and results from 
long and deliberative public discussion and substantial reflection by political 
actors. If a given legislation rearranges the constitutional powers, it has the 
equivalent effect of an amendment and its effect is indistinguishable from a 
formal amendment so long as both bind political actors.  
In this respect, one can take the instance of the Dire Dawa City Charter. 
There were claims made by the Oromia and Somalia regions over Dire Dawa 
city administration. Until the claims of these regional states were resolved, as 
per the decision of the government, the HPR passed a law granting self-
administration of the city in the meantime. Although the timeline to decide 
whether the city belongs to the Oromia or Somali regions had lapsed, the federal 
government continued to make special laws to ensure self-governance of the 
people of Dire Dawa city administration and made the city accountable to it. 
There were questions regarding the constitutional base of the charter. This 
legislation which vests autonomous powers to the city can be cited as an 
amendment to the Constitution through legislation.  
It is not difficult to mention instances of actual unwritten constitutional 
change in Ethiopia. One example of informal change is the growth in the range 
of federal power. The text of the Constitution defines the scope of federal 
powers.142 Deviating from this, the federal government may now regulate 
subject matters that a decade ago would have been regarded as concurrent 
powers of both tiers of government. No formal amendment to the Constitution 
authorizes this expansion of federal government’s power. This expansion in 
federal power comes about principally through government decision.  
Our constitutional account has seen many developments that must be 
regarded as changes of constitutional magnitude, but that have not been 
accompanied by a formal amendment. The examples in this regard include the 
taking away of the joint power of taxation by the federal government, enacting 
Dire Dawa City Administration Proclamation, and conferring the mandate to 
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organize intergovernmental relation to the federal government.143 On the other 
hand, empowering regional states to decide identity questions, accepting the 
supremacy of federal laws by regional states and enforcing federal laws by their 
own right are some of the instances which have taken place informally although 
they need constitutional amendments. These aspects of change in our system 
have to be considered fundamental enough to assume constitutional magnitude.  
5.1 Constitutional  interpretation: The Silte case  
Constitutional interpretation is one of the customary means by which 
constitutions are adapted to changing political, social or economic realities.144 It 
is in this sense that the FDRE Constitution empowers the House of Federation to 
entertain matters that give rise to constitutional dispute.145 Thus, a constitutional 
dispute, in the context of the Ethiopian Constitution, has two aspects: the first 
relates to general task of interpreting the Constitution with a view to ascertain 
the meaning, content and scope of a constitutional provision, and the second 
aspect refers to the task of determining the constitutionality of “federal or state 
law”.146  
Pursuant to the first aspect, the House may modify the contents of the 
Constitution in the course of asserting or defining the scope of a certain term. 
On the other hand, if the federal government overreaches or derogates, through 
its law or other decision, the powers and interests of the states against the 
federal Constitution’s division of powers, this could be corrected by the House 
of Federation through its power of constitutional interpretation.147 The decision 
of the House is applicable on other similar constitutional matters that may arise 
in the future.148 This amounts to altering a constitution through unusual 
mechanisms or informally. The following decision of the House in the Silte case 
illustrates an informal constitutional amendment.  
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This case was initially filed in the House of Federation.149 The applicants 
filed their case to the House alleging that Silte had been considered Gurage 
against their will for a long period, although they are not truly Gurage.150 They 
argued that Silte people have their own language, territory and history, which 
are unique from Gurage. They contended that being considered as Gurage 
contravenes with their right to self-determination and amounts to complete 
denial of their right to self-government. The relief they sought from the House 
was to ensure their right to self-determination, which is constitutionally granted, 
by recognizing them as distinct ethnic group separate from the Gurage.151 
The House referred the case to the Council of Constitutional Inquiry 
(hereinafter called, CCI) to make the necessary investigation and come up with 
fitting recommendation on the following issue: Who can determine if a given 
community claims self-determination asserting that it fulfils all criteria specified 
in Article 39(5) of the FDRE Constitution.152 Upon reviewing the case, the CCI 
framed the following questions for consideration: who shall decide on questions 
that arise in the determination of ethnic identity of a given community under the 
FDRE Constitution? What is the procedure that should be followed to reach a 
decision on such matters?  
Upon its investigation, the CCI made the necessary examination on the 
Constitution and concluded that there is hardly any clear and specific 
constitutional provision that directly addresses these issues.153 Then, it accepted 
the fact that the Constitution is silent with regard to these matters. The CCI was 
working on how the silence of the Constitution can be construed. The CCI 
identified four potential provisions of the Constitution, i.e., Articles 39(4), 
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47(2), 52(2) (a) and 62(3) as provisions that might have relevance to address the 
questions at hand.154.  
The CCI embarked on an investigation with an attempt to check whether 
Article 39(4) is appropriate to regulate the matter. The CCI stated that Article 
39(4) is essential to determine the right to secession of nations, nationalities and 
peoples of Ethiopia.155 Since their question was to get internal self-
determination rather than withdrawal from the jurisdiction of Ethiopia –and to 
create a new sovereign state–, this constitutional provision was considered as 
inapplicable to resolve the Silte case. The next provision examined by the 
Council is Article 47. The CCI viewed that this provision is invoked in cases 
where a given community is acknowledged as a distinct nation or nationality 
within the region in which it inhabits and claims to establish its own region. 
Hence, the CCI stated that this constitutional provision is not relevant to address 
the Silte claims. 
The third constitutional provision, which was examined by the CCI, was 
Article 52(2 (a)), which pronounces that states shall have the power to establish 
a state administration that best advances self-government.156 When regional 
states establish state administration that best advances self-government, they are 
expected to take into account the language, settlement pattern and identities of 
the community, which seeks self-determination. Moreover, regional states that 
seek to establish state administration are expected to primarily determine the 
identity of the community concerned. Therefore, the mandate to determine the 
identity of a given community is left to regional states and is expected to be 
considered in the regional council in which the community that seeks self-
government inhabits.  
The House (in its decision) indicated that in the process of determining this 
issue, the regional state council (to whom the claim is submitted) is expected to 
conduct referendum with direct participation of the community that has lodged 
the claim. According to the decision of the House, this should be conducted by 
secret ballot, in a free and fair manner and should be attended by impartial 
observers. However, if a community, which invokes an identity claim, is 
dissatisfied with decision of the State Council or if it feels that the decision of 
the State Council contradicts with the Constitution, it can appeal to the House of 
Federation. The House derives this power from the interpretation of Article 
62(3) of the Constitution. The provision states that the House, in accordance 
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with the Constitution, decides on issues relating to the rights of Nations, 
Nationalities and Peoples self-determination, including the right to secession.157 
This decision is a breakthrough in updating the FDRE Constitution. The 
interpretation of the House in the Silte case adds new dimension which was not 
foreseen by the drafters of Constitution to be expressly included therein. The 
decision of the House updates the contents of the Constitution on three points. 
First, it empowers the regional states to determine the identity of a nation, 
nationality and people of Ethiopia. Second, the decision sets a time framework 
within which the identity determination claim that appears before a State 
Council shall be decided, by indicating in the decision that the concerned state 
council shall, within a year, render a decision on a dispute submitted to it. Third, 
the decision also authorizes the House of Federation to review the decision of 
the State Council if the claimant community lodges an appeal to it. The decision 
of the House will be final over the matter. The three points indicated 
hereinabove have general effect, which can be applicable on similar 
constitutional matters that may arise in the future.158  
5.2  Informal constitutional changes through legislation  
Starting from the Transitional Government after the downfall of the Dergue 
regime, the legislature has enacted numerous laws. The laws which were 
enacted before and after Constitution are required to be in conformity with the 
Constitution. This means, whenever the federal government enacts a law on 
certain matters, it is expected to show its constitutional source on the preamble 
of the legislation. In doing so, the federal government constitutionalizes its act 
of passing laws on the matter at hand. This stems from constitutional principles, 
which require the legislative body to indicate its constitutional source for those 
powers that can be exercised by any level of government.159 However, there are 
a number of proclamations, which are enacted by the HoPR without authority 
that emanates from the Federal Constitution.  
5.2.1  Dire Dawa city Administration Proclamation  
As highlighted earlier, there were claims made by the Oromia and Somalia 
regions over Dire Dawa city administration following the regional boundary 
demarcation.160 There was also a need to regulate self-determination of the Dire 
Dawa city residents by law until the claims of Somalia and Oromia Regions 
                                           
157 See Article 62(3) of the FDRE Constitution.  
158 See article 11(1) of Proclamation No. 251/2001, supra note 139. 
159 Assefa Fiseha (2006), Federalism and the Accommodation of Diversity in Ethiopia: A 
Comparative Study. (Netherlands: Wolf Legal Publisher), p. 121. 
160 See first paragraph of the preamble, Proclamation No. 416/2004 the Dire Dawa 
Administration Charter Proclamation, 10th Year No. 60, Addis Ababa, 30th July, 2004. 
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were finally resolved.161 It was thus decided (since 1993) that Dire Dawa City 
be accountable to and be directed by the Federal Government.162 It is this 
measure that enabled the federal government to pass a law that granted self-
administration to ensure good governance and expedite development in Dire 
Dawa City until a lasting solution is secured.163 It was based on this premise that 
the HoPR enacted Dire Dawa Administration Proclamation.  
The Proclamation does not mention the constitutional basis that justifies the 
enactment of the Charter. However, the Charter is still functional and has not 
been declared unconstitutional. Pursuant to this charter, Dire Dawa is under the 
federal government in spite of competing claims from Oromia and Somalia 
regional states. The purpose of the legislation, according to the government, was 
to make it possible for the parliament to make special laws to ensure self-
governance of the people of Dire Dawa city administration and to enable the 
federal government to co-operate with the States in searching a lasting solution 
for the claims of the two regions on the city.  
Later on, the HoPR has revised the Dire Dawa City Administration Charter. 
The preamble of the revised Proclamation states that the amendment is made 
pursuant to Article 55(1) of the FDRE Constitution.164 However, the provision 
cited in the revised Proclamation or other parts of the Constitution do not entrust 
this mandate to the HoPR. One may thus argue that this illustrates informal 
constitutional amendment that increases the powers of the federal government 
by legislation. 
5.2.2 Intergovernmental relations (IGR)  
In Ethiopia, the Constitution essentially provides dual governmental structure 
and allots separate jurisdiction to each level of government.165 Though the 
jurisdictions of the federal government and the member states are distinctly 
delineated, there are important constitutional provisions emphasizing the need 
for consultation, coordination and collaboration.166 It is possible to argue that, 
the federal government and the constituent states are interdependent in a wide 
range of matters. However, the FDRE Constitution is vague regarding the 
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mandate to make law concerning intergovernmental relations. A focal point for 
intergovernmental relation remains unanswered by the Constitution. This power 
is neither given expressly to the federal government alone nor concurrently to 
the federal government and the regional states. Therefore, it is possible to argue 
that this mandate is reserved to the regional states.167   
Nevertheless, the HoPR construed the ambiguity of the Constitution by 
authorizing one of the institutions of the executive branches to perform IGR 
tasks. This issue is largely answered by Proclamation No. 691/2010168 which 
authorizes the Ministry of Federal Affairs to serve as a focal point to organize 
IGR.169 The Proclamation sets general guidelines that regulate the relationship 
between the federal and the state governments. It requires that the federal-state 
relationship should be on the basis of a spirit of partnership and mutual 
understanding rather hierarchical relations170 with a view to ensuring sustainable 
peaceful coexistence and strengthening of the federal system. A question that 
inevitably arises is whether this amounts to giving extra mandate to the 
Ministry, which is not envisaged under the FDRE Constitution.  
The same Proclamation has made modifications on the exclusive power of 
the House of Federation, which is given to the House by the Constitution. The 
Proclamation confers this exclusive power (of the House) upon the Ministry of 
Federal Affairs. Article 62(6) of the Constitution provides: “It (House of 
Federation) shall strive to find solutions to disputes or misunderstandings that 
may arise between States.” Despite the existence of such constitutional 
provision, the mandate to facilitate the resolution of disputes arising between 
regional states, –so long as it does not contradict with the powers of the House 
of Federation– is given to the Ministry of federal Affairs. Article 14(1) (b) of the 
Proclamation reads: “without prejudice to the provisions of Article 48 and 62(6) 
of the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, the Ministry 
of federal Affair has the power to facilitate the resolution of disputes arising 
between regional states.”  By so doing, the legislation apportions the express 
constitutional powers of House of Federation so that it can be shared with the 
Ministry of Federal Affairs. This can be viewed as an informal way of 
introducing change on the provision of the Constitution.  
 
                                           
167 See article 52(1) of the FDRE Constitution. 
168 See article 14(1) of Proclamation 691/2010 ‘Definition of Powers and Duties of the 
Executive Organs of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia’ Federal Negarit 
Gazeta 17th  Year No. 1, Addis Ababa 27th October, 2010. 
169 Id., see article 14(1) (e). It should be noted that the proclamation was enacted principally 
to define the power of the Federal Executive Institutions.  
170 Ibid.  
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5.3  Law Enforcement, Administrative and Political Practices 
Institutional practice seeks to establish a new normative or institutional 
framework for state policy and, over time, it can be embedded in the public 
culture. Thus, political norms/practices and its institutional or normative 
principles have a broad effect on the Constitution including an informal 
constitutional amendment. There are many situations that are not regulated by a 
constitution but governed by political custom within the legislative and 
executive bodies. Such customary political practices have been designed for the 
purpose of adapting a constitution to new circumstances without affecting its 
legal continuity. In this sense, habitual institutional practices try to fill gaps in 
the Constitution and can be regarded as indicators of informal constitutional 
amendment. There are various political practices that emerge when a 
constitution is silent. The constitutionality of the practice may not be challenged 
because many practices may not clearly contradict express constitutional 
provisions.  
The conduct of states in adopting the federal supremacy clause in their 
constitutions and various laws and in the enforcement of federal laws on matters 
that are not delegated to them are examples of issues that are not discernible 
from a reading of the FDRE Constitution. However, there is the practice in 
Ethiopia of enforcing federal law by states171 and considering federal law as 
supreme over state laws. In this regard, Assefa argues that the federal 
government has at least three ways to influence the state governments and 
facilitate the enforcement of federal laws and programs: namely, the Ministry of 
Federal Affairs, party structure and the process of policy making.172 
Undoubtedly, these are powerful examples of unwritten constitutional principles 
that continue to guide the course of the Ethiopian federal state.  
5.3.1 Federal Law supremacy  
It is important to analyse the effect of enacting legislation by the federal 
government in the field of concurrent powers. “The Ethiopian Constitution is 
silent as far as the thorny issue of regulating the relationship between federal 
and state law” is concerned in case of conflict between state and federal law.173 
There are certainly two views. Some scholars argue that the Ethiopian federal 
system adopts federal supremacy clause by default.174  But others adhere to the 
‘supremacy of nations, nationalities and peoples’ and contend that federal law 
will not pre-empt state law.175Assefa, states that “the best compromise is to 
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decide the issues on a case-by-case basis rather than subscribing to either 
principle at an abstract level”.176 
The practice of regional states and their constitutions support the existence of 
federal supremacy clause in Ethiopia.177 Normally, regional states acknowledge 
the supremacy of federal laws over inconsistent state laws. They give such 
recognition through their constitutions.178 In the first place, regional state 
constitutions describe the state council as the legislative body of the state and 
also vest the highest political power regarding internal affairs of the regional 
state. The same constitutions also include a provision that gives the state council 
the mandate to issue laws that are consistent with the Federal Constitution and 
other federal laws.179 It is true that the regional states’ laws and federal laws are 
expected to be consistent with FDRE Constitution. However, the FDRE 
Constitution does not expressly state the supremacy of federal laws over state 
laws that are inconsistent to it. Nevertheless, most regional states subject their 
laws to the federal Constitution and other federal laws. This is one of the areas 
in which supremacy of federal law is admitted by the regional state.180 Solomon 
Negussie argues: “states Constitutions and legislations which came at the later 
stage affirmed that all laws and practices should not contradict the federal 
constitution as well as federal laws”.181  
5.3.2  Cooperation through Executive Institutions 
Federal executive institutions execute federal laws,182 while regional 
governments may execute laws enacted by the federal government where the 
federal government delegates regional states to do so. The federal government is 
expected to grant this power through a proclamation, or this can be done through 
regulation when the legislative organ allows the executive organ to give its 
powers to its counterpart offices in the regional states. Departing from this 
principle, the Ministry of Justice (currently reorganized as the Federal Attorney 
                                           
176 Ibid, p. 330. 
177 This kind of argument begs the question, does it the purpose of the regional states 
constitution, to undermine their powers and autonomy? The author would like to discuss 
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180 See article 51(1) of SNNPR and other regional state constitutions, supra note177.   
181 Solomon Negussie, supra note 18, p. 65. 
182 See article 77(1) of the FDRE Constitution.  
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General), for instance, delegates its power of prosecution to a regional justice 
bureau through a letter where an offence is committed in a given region.183 
This issue evokes further discussion. In order to file a criminal charge, the 
investigation is undertaken by a police officer. The issue then becomes whether 
the police officer at the federal or regional level makes the investigation. It is the 
Federal Police Commission that has the power to investigate crimes that fall 
under the jurisdiction of Federal Courts.184 But, the move to establish federal 
police institutions within regional states to effect arrest and make necessary 
investigation on federal criminal matters is inconsequential. Due to the absence 
of federal police officers who undertake criminal investigation, it is the 
respective regional officers who are undertaking criminal investigation in all 
states. Another question that needs clarification is whether regional police 
officers have the authority to do so.  
In this scenario, one may possibly mention Proclamation No. 313/2003 
(Federal Police Commission Proclamation) that requires the Federal Police 
Commission to work in cooperation with the Regional Police Commissions in 
the prevention and investigation of crimes.185 The Regional Police Commissions 
are accountable to the Federal Police Commission when they investigate 
criminal cases that fall under the jurisdiction of the Federal Courts in accordance 
with the delegation given to them.186 This provision denotes the situation that 
makes regional police organs accountable to the Federal Police Commission 
while they investigate federal criminal cases.  
This proclamation implicitly answers the inevitability of delegation of 
powers. However, neither the Proclamation nor other regulations delegate 
regional police organs to make investigation on federal criminal cases. Even the 
Federal Police Commission does not delegate its powers to the regional state 
through letter.187 However, it is regular practice that the regional state police 
undertake investigation on criminal cases. This amounts to enlarging the powers 
of the regional state. This is also equivalent to informally amending the 
Constitution by disuse due to the fact that the Federal Police Commission has 
failed to establish and use its power of prosecuting offences in all regional 
states. 
 
                                           
183 See letter issued by the Ministry of Justice file number 01/A14/12/12 , on 15/07/98 EC. 
184 See, Article 7(1) of Proclamation No. 313/2003, Federal Police Commission 
Proclamation, Federal Negarit Gazeta, 9th Year No. 30, Addis Ababa, 4th January, 2003.  
185 Id., Article 23(1)(2) of  Federal Police Commission Proclamation. 
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5.3.3 Ruling Party modus operandi and its influence on federal 
arrangements and development plans  
Political parties are extremely important elements of a federation. The nature of 
political parties and their internal operation has an impact on the working of a 
federation.188 The structure of party systems and the way political parties are 
organized might reinforce or corrode the federal division of powers. In general, 
the role played by political parties is among the major determinant factors in the 
operation of federal systems,189 and at times it affects the constitutional and the 
institutional guarantees. Constitutional and institutional guarantees are meant to 
prevent political leaders at the central level from changing the federal bargain 
unilaterally. However, these guarantees are ineffectual when one homogeneous 
party controls both levels of government because there will be no opposition 
against the change.190 This is because central decisions can substitute federal 
bargain.  As Assefa argues, if one homogeneous party controls both levels of 
government, there would be no occasion for intergovernmental conflicts.191 
 The character of parties and party systems can affect the working of the 
whole federation. This is because a “political party is expected to harmonize the 
policies of the federal government and constituent states”.192 Ethiopia, presently, 
is ruled by a coalition composed of several regionally based ethnic parties. 
Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) is controlling all 
the regional state governments in the Ethiopian federation; either directly 
through the member parties or indirectly through affiliated parties.193As a result, 
the party structure in Ethiopia undermines the federal division of power and 
subordinates the regional governments to the federal government with particular 
emphasis on socio-economic development policies.194  It is clear that a mandate 
to make social, economic and development policies is distributed to the federal 
and state governments. Contrary to this constitutional power distribution, the 
Federal government, through the party line, has informally taken over the 
powers to make social, economic and development polices given to the federal 
and the state governments and has been engaged in preparing the same for both 
levels of government.  
The practice in Growth and Transformation Plan is another area of practice 
which illustrates informal changes in federal arrangements. The FDRE 
Constitution clearly delineates the powers between the federal and member 
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states with respect to social, economic and development plans.195 Pursuant to 
this power distribution, the federal government is empowered to formulate and 
implement nationwide policies, strategies and plans with respect to overall 
economic, social and development matters.196 The Constitution authorizes 
regional states to prepare the same at state level: to formulate and execute 
economic, social and development policies, strategies and plans of the regional 
states.197 Despite this constitutional ruling, the social, economic and development 
strategic plan is prepared centrally for both levels of government. By 
implication, the power to make social, economic and development policies is 
shifted to the federal authorities. Under these circumstances, regional states 
draw their respective plan from the wider plan, which is generated and approved 
first through party lines.198 
A central committee, which leads the ruling coalition, often through the 
chairman, generates specific plans of action, which are the basis for five-year 
plans that will be implemented nationwide. The five-year plan becomes the 
basis for the economic, social and development policies, strategies and plans of 
federal and state governments’.199 Apparently, both tiers of government are 
expected either to prepare their respective plans based on the document which is 
prepared through party line or to revise their plan in line with centrally prepared 
plan since they are under the direct control and influence of the ruling party. As 
a result, currently, the federal government and the states draw their respective 
plans from the wider plan, which is generated and approved first through party 
lines.200 This in turn undermines the constitutional mandate of the regional states 
to formulate and implement plans and policies of their own.201 They implement 
the social, economic and development plan prepared by the party line. The 
growth and transformation plan serves as the social, economic and development 
plan of the regional states. In so doing, the party line has taken away their power 
to make social, economic and development polices in the context of harmony. 
Concluding Remarks  
The embodiment of a mechanism for constitutional amendment is among the 
universal features of constitutions.  The mechanisms of amendment denote the 
idea of correction or improvement of prior choices in constitutional design in 
light of new information, evolving experience or political understanding. 
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However, significant controversy remains over the function of formal 
procedures for all kinds of constitutional amendment.  Most constitutional 
scholars agree that not all forms of constitutional change in fact involve 
processes of constitutional amendment. Some scholars even suggest that formal 
constitutional amendments will be irrelevant to ultimately shape constitutional 
meaning. As a consequence, political actors frequently look for alternatives to 
formal constitutional amendment.  Although the formal mechanism is a vital 
apparatus to modify a constitution, the role of non-constitutional mechanisms in 
the alteration of a constitution is also profound. Hence, the function, relation and 
co-existence of formal and non-formal mechanisms need to be clearly spelled 
out. The extent to which and the circumstances under which non-constitutional 
mechanisms modify the contents of the constitution need to be ascertained.  
The FDRE Constitution, like many other constitutions, encompasses 
constitutional provisions that spell out how the Constitution can be amended. 
However, the Constitution has not been formally amended, except the 
unfinished move to amend it on a single occasion. The Constitution has served 
for more than two decades without substantial formal modification. On the other 
hand, it is not difficult to mention instances of actual unwritten constitutional 
changes in the Constitution. One of the means of informal change is through 
constitutional interpretation. This entails the possibility that decisions of the 
House of Federation can update the contents of the Constitution in the course of 
asserting or defining the scope of certain terms or provisions in general. The 
second instance where unwritten constitutional change in Ethiopia has taken 
place is when the federal government enacts a law on certain matters. There are 
a number of proclamations, which are enacted by the HoPR even if that 
particular power is not clearly given to the federal government. Proclamations 
that govern Dire Dawa City Administration and intergovernmental relation are 
some of the examples.  
Another example of practices that is not discernible from the reading of the 
FDRE Constitution relates to the acknowledgment of federal law supremacy by 
regional states through their constitutions and their willingness to enforce 
federal laws on matters that are not delegated to them. It is to also be noted that 
the party structure in Ethiopia and its practices informally change the federal 
division of power and this setting subordinates social, economic and 
development polices of regional governments to the federal government. This is 
contrary to the constitutional power distribution given to the Federal and the 
State governments. In so doing, the party line has, without formal constitutional 
amendment, taken over the power of regional states to make social, economic 
and development polices.                                                                                      ■ 
